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ABSTRACT

This review examines research in moral and spiritual development during the adolescent years, with a primary focus on Piaget's and Kohlberg's theories. It begins by presenting definitions of morality and then discusses theories of moral development set forth by Piaget, Elkind, and Kohlberg. Theories of Piaget and Kohlberg are briefly compared. Data supporting a multidimensional model for moral development is compared and evaluated in light of Piagetian and Kohlbergian approaches. Implications for educators are discussed. Tables and figures illustrating Kohlberg's six moral stages; characteristics and assessment of stages; samples of reasoning at each moral stage; scoring of moral judgments of Eichmann for developmental stages; means and standard deviations for early, middle, and late adolescent males and females on dimensions of moral reasoning; and the Heinz dilemma are appended. Five pages of references are included. (NB)

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MORAL AND SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE ADOLESCENT

[Jane Bernat McGinnis]

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MORAL AND SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT IN

THE ADOLESCENT: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

Introduction

The following treatise examines research in moral and spiritual development during adolescent years. Primary focus will be directed in the areas of Piaget's and Kohlberg's theories. Data supporting a multidimensional model for moral development will be compared and evaluated in the light of Piagetian and Kohlbergian approaches. Implications for educators in the light of these specific findings will be posited and supported.

The initial question though for some perhaps would be to define morality; for without definition how can we focus on something as intangible as morality? Morality encompasses the personal responsibility, impartiality, and promotion of people's well-being (Barrow, 1986, P. 52). Moral development involves rules and conventions about what people should do in interactions with other people (Santrock, 1983). All peoples have a collection of values, ideals, attitudes inculcated within their society but these do not necessarily constitute morality. Morality in the highest sense must transcend the culture; today, yesterday and even tomorrow. There is indeed a higher calling for which people of greatness

are especially given to strive. Herbert Hoover stated:

> Let us remember that the great human advances have not been brought about by mediocre men and women. They were brought about by distincly uncommon people with vital sparks of leadership. Many great leaders were of humble origin, but that alone was not their greatness. (Nichols, 1959)

This uncommonness or striving and progressing to higher heights is what this treatise examines. What pathes, what stages do people take as they reach to touch the intangible stars?

Albert Schweitzer (Nichols, 1959) on "Something "More" exhorts:

> It is not enough merely to exist. That is all very well. But you must do something more. Seek always to do some good, somewhere. Every man has to seek in his own way to make his own self more noble and to realize his own true worth.
>
> You must give some time to your fellow man. Even if it's a little thing, do something for which you get no pay but the privilege of doing it. For remember, you don't live in a world all your own. Your brothers are here, too. (p. 138)

Morality as Piaget has delineated (Piaget, 1932) exists on various planes; even into adulthood some

individuals do not break into the clouds of the higher level planes. Eppels (Musgrove, 1986) has examined five dimensions of moral values. Musgrove (1986) conducted a longitudinal cross-cultural study with adolescents involving their values and moral issues. Values and thinking structures were concurrent and consistent over 10 years time.

The values involved in these studies were personal relations, justice, responsibility, goals, aspirations, authority and independence. Although some of the factors involved deal more with personality factors or extrinsic situations, justice and responsibility can be seen as lying at the core of moral values. It is extrinsic factors and personal motivation often that shift the moral behavior towards one direction or the other. In Musgrove's study (1986), it was found that older adolescents were more thoughtful in considering the proposed moral issues.

The Constructs or Theories

Piaget

In order to evaluate the processes one must examine the premises upon which the moral and cognitive developmental processes are based. Piaget approaches moral development in processes from a structuralist psychological focus. Piaget sees children as progressing

in development through, though not necessarily, age related sequences. The cognitive-structuralist gives minimal attention to subconscious thought processes. This perspective focuses on rational thinking processes of the individual. Stages exist in ordered uniform sequence for all children. Jean Piaget was concerned with how children think in not only the answers they give correctly but also the hows and whys of their mistakes (Santrock, 1983). Following are Piaget's developmental stages (later moral stages will be explained):

I Sensorimotor Stage (0-2)

II Pre-Operational (2-7)

III Concrete Operational (7-11)

IV Formal Operational (11-14)

In Piaget's moral reasoning viewpoint there exist two stages of moral thought; moral realism (younger, earlier developmental stages) and moral autonomy (older, ten years plus). He views children from 7-10 years as being in transitional stages which encompass characteristics of both moral realism and moral autonomy (Santrock, 1983). Piaget through observations of children with the game and rules of marbles developed his moral theories (Santrock, 1983). The schema and structure of moral development theories of Piaget as well as Kohlberg are

(1) innate, (2) invariant, (3) hierarchical, and (4) culturally universal. The rate and shape was thought by Piaget to be influenced by social factors. Piaget analyzed these influences, responses and reactions in observing children play marbles (Rich, 1985, p. 47). Complementing the observations is the clinical interview.

Rich (1985) defines the process of moral development as the two-fold maturation (p. 48). The initial stage is the heteronomous morality in which a very young child bases moral judgment on unilateral respect for authority figures, deals with objective rules of parents and other adults. This morality is one of constraint, absolutistic thought, immanent concepts of justice and fairness. The second stage is that of autonomous morality. This becomes the morality of equity in early childhood to early adolescence in which the individual develops a more "subjective" sense of autonomy and reciprocity. In this stage, social experience, principally peer interaction, becomes the main vehicle for increasingly cooperative, egalitarian growth (Rich). During this period studies have shown that peer interaction can substitute for adult supervision (Rich, p. 27). The inner perceptions and external reality of the individual are constantly interacting to produce the behavior exhibited. As mentioned previously, no one factor can

be attributed to specific outcomes.

In Piagetian terms one may conceive of cooperation as constituting the ideal form of equilibrium towards which society tends when compulsory conformity come to break down. Cooperation seems to be essentially the social relation which tends to eliminate infantile phenomena. It is the limit and norm of every human group that has ever existed. The rise from egocentric views to more objective is the key idea of this discussion. Moral values indeed act as a strong motivational influence upon one's behavior. However, people do not always act upon those values. The Socratic view opts that one who knows good does it and no man ever willingly does what is wrong (Straughan, 1983, p. 187).

Elkind on Religion

Then, is to be "religious" the apex of moral development? Elkind (1979, p. 225) notes that children form conceptions about religion which differ from those acquired from institutions. Most studies from Elkind's assessment deal with acquired religion. He has also observed that individuals of varying ages may know of and about definitions and meanings of the religion but lack in true understanding. Elkind's studies (1979) bring to light that in such broad age ranges as

4 through 14, the God concept was misunderstood. Conceptions range, at the upper age brackets, from concrete to the abstract. In reference not only to moral development, but also spiritual depth, the prime question remains: To what extent does the child's response truly reflect his own mental constructions? Elkind states: "Religious identity can be defined in terms of the spontaneous meanings children attach to their religious denomination" (p. 162).

Three states Elkind establishes in spiritual development are:

I Global Unidfferentiated

II Concrete Differentiated

III Abstract Differentiation Conception

The religious identity progresses from vague through to abstract. The ages 11-12 signify the time when most children come to think of their religious identity in particular beliefs. A key dilemma in the spiritual process involves spontaneous and acquired religion.

Elkind (1979) purveys:

> Conceptions of God, belief, prayer, sin, morality, and many others all deserve to be looked at from the point of view of spontaneous religion. It would be fascinating too if someone were to undertake a study of children's confusion between

> magic and ritual and of children's attempts at integrating moral and religious ideas. For the study of these issues and of many more like them, the semi-clinical interview is a necessary starting point. (p. 266)

The social issues of the sixties and seventies brought forth not only spiritual reexaminations but profound focus on social issues. The climate of the times provided the atmosphere for accentuated controversy for examinations in moral issues. Such issues conveyed to the public that it was time to look askance at some issues involving civil rights, Vietnam, Watergate, the women's movement.

Discrepancies arise as individuals move from moral realism to moral relativity. A young child from most theorists' viewpoints is aware of moral rules and duties. He/she does not see them as social arrangements and human devices for regulating cooperative interaction. The child first views moral rules as fixed in nature of things, like natural, physical laws perpetuating the same rules for everyone. This leads to the realization that moral rules are cooperative arrangements among equals agreed upon for mutual benefits (autonomous morality) (Rest, 1979).

Kohlberg and Piaget

James Rest agrees with Piaget's views that moral development is cognitively structured, there is a sequential evolution and these stages at least provide limited characterization (Rest, 1979). Piaget and Kohlberg agree that cognitive and moral ability run concurrently. Piaget does not adhere to IQ as being indicative of cognitive and moral development. He supports the premise that underlying conceptual capacities exist (Rich, 1979). Both Piaget and Kohlberg support interaction of genetic endowment and social experiences as predispositions for significant cognitive development. Another concurrent postulate is that peer interaction remains to be of major importance in the social stimulation that challenges the child to change the moral perspective. The interacting forces of peer give-and-take provide the child with opportunity to take the role of the other person and to generate rules democratically (Santrock, 1983).

Kohlberg

The history of moral reason of course has a long history in philosophy. We have all heard of Kantian reasoning, Nietzsche's will to power, and Plato and Aristotle's truth. The concept of justice and moral reasoning was preeminently posited by Earl Barnes

(Stanford, 1890's), Piaget (1932), and Kohlberg (1958) (Berling, 1981).

Kohlberg's structuralist theory involves a sequence of invariant steps. His theory (Kohlberg, 1969) stresses the prime importance of the development of information processing skills (attention, memory, inference making) for developing more advanced stages in the moral development continuum. Kohlberg originally found that with increasing age more advanced moral judgments emerged, stages of advancement are significantly related to intelligence, and social participation in groups provides the impetus for advancing moral judgment (Santrock, 1983, p. 350).

Kohlbergian stages are delineated and defined below:

Level I - Preconventional - Good, Bad

Level II - Conventional - Role Conformity

Level III - Postconventional - Principled

Within each level exist two stages (see Appendix, Table 1).

Kohlberg used interviews with major revisions every ten years (1958, 1971, 1978). He first focused on individual development and the psychology of moral reasoning. Later group norms comprised the essence of sociology. Berling criticizes Kohlberg in the failure to find a stage six in American and Turkish longitudinal

data. Theoretically stage six comprises people of such ethical standing as Eleanor Roosevelt, Martin Luther King, Gandhi, Albert Schweitzer (Berling, 1981). This is the stage of universality. Universality has been designated as Kohlberg's last stage in much of the literature. However, Kohlberg goes beyond universality to a seventh stage of cosmic. The interesting factor of stage seven involves the question of why be moral? Questions involving stage seven are not resolvable on purely logical or rational grounds but based on the cosmic perspective (Nidich, 1983). Nidich, et al. view the stage as encompassing the whole life and cosmic attitude as opposed to a universal humanistic view. The authors (Nidich et al., 1983) support this stage in stating:

> Kohlberg (1973) mentions Plato's writings and Spinoza's "natural law" as expressions of this cosmic perspective. This unified perspective also parallels the quantum mechanical view of the universe where the new notion of "unbroken wholeness" and the "inseparable quantum inter connectedness of the whole universe" supersedes the classical idea of separately and independently existing parts. (Bohm & Hiley, 1975, from Nidich et al.)

Nidich et al. note that TM (transcendental meditation) programs focus at this level by "turning the attention inwards toward the subtler levels of a thought until the mind arrives at the source of thought" (Maharishi, 1969, in Nidich et al., p. 470).

Research from Nidich et al. also supports the theory of brain activity and relationship to thought stages. In the cosmic stage frontal EEG alpha coherence correlate with creativity, and clarity of experience (Nidich et al., 1983). The flexibility in thinking and higher cognitive functioning would stem from an integrated comprehension of a holistic cosmic perspective of life interconnected.

It should be noted, however, that Piaget was extremely cautious, tentative, and nonspecific about the use of the stage concept in moral judgment research.

Kohlberg posited the following in conjunction with his moral stage theories (Rest, 1979, p. 52):

Characteristics and Assessment of Stages:

(1) Time occurs when each stage has a predominance over all others

(2) Step by step sequence - there is never a mix of more than two stages and these stages can only be consecutive (2 and 3 or 3 and 4 but no mix of 2, 3, 4)

(3) Evenly spaced across development, symmetrical and identical rate of onset and decline

(4) Alteration between stages of transition to stages of consolidation inversely or progressing to consolidation then transition

(5) Peak of stage usage is the peak of consolidation

(see Appendix, Figure 1).

Changes though in stage transition often give rise to fluctuations (Flavell & Wokwill, 1969, p. 99). Just as in Piaget's cognitive development the horizontal decaloge of some concepts exists, the moral stages are not synchronous. Also test characteristics produce inconsistencies.

Rest (1969) notes that it is not uncommon in cognitive developmental research to find discrepancies in attributing structural competence when different response modes are required of the subject. It is difficult to see a person in any step at one true level (p. 60).

Berling (1981) has found in his analysis of Kohlbergian stages the following:

(1) There are more progressive than regressive changes in moral development

(2) There are more progressive than regressive

changes in the lower stages of moral reasoning

(3) There are more progressive than regressive changes in the higher stages of moral reasoning

(4) Progressive changes in moral development occur stepwise, age differences in moral reasoning are replicable cross nationally

(5) The same set of stages of moral development will be found in all cultures studied (p. 8).

Rest (1979) states:

A prevalent criticism of Piagetian research is that the favorite method of structural assessment, the clinical interview, may underestimate the structural competencies [educators do this too] of a child. In interviewing, a child is credited with having a structure only if he can express it, explain it, justify it and sometimes argue against its alternatives. A person may be able to organize his or her actions and make discriminations using a structure without being able to talk about the structure or give evidence in his verbalization that he has the structure. Piagetian researchers who use non-verbal means of assessment often report earlier ages of acquisition of cognitive structure than do researches who use more verbally loaded means of assessment. (p. 60)

Now as previously stated clinical questionnaries and interviews are primary tools in assigning the moral development stages. The Defining Issues Test (DIT) is a functional tool in assessing moral judgment. Subjects may rate or rank prototypic issues. A prime issue example is the Heinz Dilemma. Rest devised a scale for rating and ranking prototypic issues involving DIT such as the Heinz Dilemma. (See Appendix, Figure 2 and Tables 2 and 3.)

Rest concludes most adults arrive and remain at the stage three level. He posits though that with adults, moral judgment is more positively related to education than age (Rest, 1979, p. 112).

Summary: Multifaceted Factors and Moral Development

Structures, development and analysis have primarily been discussed to this point. In light of the theories meta-analysis and development the following will posit some brief correlates for moral development. Such correlates would attempt to answer such questions as in what sectors if any can we find high stages of development? How much of a relationship exists between values and behavior? How does the affective domain interact and influence moral development?

Rest in his studies correlates religious affiliations with moral development as well as an

interaction of geographic regions. In a United States sample predominantly lower scores on the DIT arose in the south, the conservative and traditional sectors. Ernsberger in Rest (Rest, 1979, p. 115) in his study saw Unitarian Universalist church members and Methodist members employed more principled thinking at least in their educational materials and official dictums or statutes than members of Baptist and Lutheran churches in Missouri. Within the churches varied levels on the score were significant in that the Unitarian and Methodist lay leaders scored higher, while in random samples from congregations Baptist and Lutheran lay leaders had significantly lower scores than those from the congregation.

The following is a statistical breakdown of a Rest (1979, p. 118) study on comparative groups:

Philosophers 79% score on DIT

Seminarians 62% score on DIT

Ninth Graders 46% score on DIT

From the study of Nidich (Nidich et al., 1983, p. 168) exists supportive evidence that cosmic oriented people score in the seventh stage on Kohlberg's structure. These candidates express an inter connectedness with the whole of nature or universe; are in tune or harmony with the laws of nature, cosmos,

subtler qualities of creation, as a basis for morality; express being moral is in the best interest of oneself and is in the best interest of society.

Other factoring influences include the SES (socioeconomic status). To some degree Rest (1979, p. 124) sees higher SES as correlating with higher moral development and inversely so with lower SES groups.

Richard Hanks (1985) in a comparative study of three groups of children, mildly educationally subnormal children, (maladjusted) stable children, and stable children of average intelligence found correlations to moral judgments. In essence Hanks compared stability, mild retardation and intelligence. After the IQ measurements are partialled out their exist small differences in test results. This study brings to light the fact that the intelligence level rather than a personality factor would be a primary determinant in moral reasoning (Hanks, 1985).

Breslin (1986) worked on a similar study to discover factors in moral reasoning of the adolescent in Ireland. Subjects included 17 year old seniors (a group of 1,006) attending Catholic and Protestant school in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. Dilemmas on four issues were given involving tolerance and attitude involving civil rights. Findings indicated a prime relationship

between principled moral reasoning and tolerance. This factor existed regardless of religious association (Breslin, 1986). Findings through Rest's studies corroborate this relationship between moral reasoning and IQ, with correlations being .30-.50. The high verbal scores of some high scorers on moral reasoning tests demonstrate a high degree of correlation in that area (Rest, 1979, pp. 147, 150).

The gender difference is one more factor to address briefly. Richard A. Hanson and Ronald Mullis assessed moral reasoning with Flexibility of Moral Judgment Index and empathy with Emotional Maturity Scale (Hanson & Mullis, 1985). From other research Hanson and Mullis state that a relationship exists between cognitive development and role taking ability and between role taking ability and moral development. The fact that empathy does influence moral reasoning is significant but how much does it have to do with morality? Hanson and Mullis cite Hoffman (1975) as recognizing sex differences in the ability to make moral judgments. Hanson and Mullis note that females judge transgressors harshly; males more often are willing to bend the rules. Now the findings (see Appendix, Table 4) show higher emotional empathy among females increasing through adolescence. The analysis also points out that there

exists a higher flexibility score for males. However, there seems to be little relationship between empathy and moral flexibility. According though to Hanson and Mullis' interpretation of Kohlbergian stages males would score significantly higher. Now one study cannot support any hypothesis and more studies need to be completed and analyzed to begin to unfold a picture (Hanson & Mullis, 1985).

Finally though moral sensitivity (Rest, 1979) appears to become a part of the early recognition process in perceiving situations and events. However, moral conceptualization (that most clearly tapped in the DIT and Kohlberg tests) seems to be concerned more prominently with organization and interpretation of facts in recognized moral situations or perplexities. That is, this involves defining the crucial issues, justifying one alternative over another. Rest posits: "If one is morally insensitive, not even aware of a moral dilemma, then one's moral conceptualization and moral character do not matter in determining one's behavior" (Rest, 1979, p. 171).

Implications for the Future

This treatise has examined some constructs for moral reasoning. Briefly factors involving moral development have been discussed. Now given this

enlightenment the question remains can anything be done to help the adoelscent move to a higher level of moral reasoning, to become more responsible for ethical decisions? Pelsma and Borgers (1986) cite Kolb as positing four stages for development in adapting to the environment. Those are concrete experience (feeling), reflective observation (watching), abstract conceptualization (thinking), and active experimentation (doing). These all become a part of the individual learning style. In the same article, "Experience-Based Ethics," Pelsma and Borgers (1986) cite Kirby's (1979) descriptive interrelationship between learning modes and growth dimensions. They are:

Mode	Dimension Increased
Concrete Experience	Affective Complexity
Reflective Observation	Perpetual Complexity
Abstract Conceptualization	Symbolic Complexity
Active Experimentation	Behavioral Complexity

The model suggests that learning often occurs through conflict filled processes. Therefore in order for individuals to change or move into a higher level perhaps conflict or conflicted reasoning must be presented. Frequently ethic courses or discussions of such ethical issues as euthanasia, abortion, cloning, genetic engineering fulfill this conflicting process.

Programs for delinquents have been developed to help elicit and develop reasoning processes. One program was structured around the following parameters (Jennings & Kohlberg, 1983):

(1) Amount of moral discussion and dialogue

(2) Amount of resident power and responsibility for rules and decisions

(3) Amount of concerns about fairness of rules and decisions

(4) Amount of self-perceived moral behavior change.

Arbuthnot (1984) cites Parlett et al. (1975) as having found that participation in humanities courses which include frequent opportunities for moral discussion increases the moral reasoning level. Intervention programs which involve structured, guided discussions of moral dilemmas in small groups have been successful.

Brandt and Muir (1986) in a paper concerning school, society and race posit: "The role of the teacher is critical not only in respect of the teacher's selection and presentation of material, but also in the tone and attitude in which moral questions are discussed."

Philosophy has had significant impacts in moral education. Philosophical discussion may or may not lead to higher planes of thought but compressed conflict

be it mental or experiential often elicits change within the individual.

The history of moral reasoning is ancient and yet young enough to transcend the future. This treatise has touched only briefly on many facets of the issue of moral and spiritual development. This is a multifaceted topic with many interacting facets. It remains that not as a man speaketh but thinketh so also is he.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 1 KOHLBERG'S SIX MORAL STAGES

Level and Stage	What is Right	Reason for Doing Right	Social Perspective of Stage
Level 1: Preconventional **Stage 1:** Heteronomous morality	To avoid breaking rules backed by punishment, obedience for its own sake, and avoiding physical damage to persons and property.	Avoidance of punishment, and the superior power of authorities.	Egocentric point of view. Doesn't consider the interests of others or recognize that they differ from the actor's; doesn't relate two points of view. Actions are considered physically rather than in terms of psychological interests of others. Confusion of authority's perspective with one's own.

Level and Stage	What is Right	Reason for Doing Right	Social Perspective of Stage
Stage 2: Individualism, instrumental purpose, and exchange	Following rules only when it is to someone's immediate interest; acting to meet one's own interests and needs and letting others do the same. Right is also what's fair, what's an equal exchange, a deal, an agreement.	To serve one's own needs or interests in a world where you have to recognize that other people have their interests, too.	Concrete individualistic perspective. Aware that everybody has his or her own interest to pursue and that these interests conflict, so that right is relative (in the concrete individualistic sense).
Level II: Conventional **Stage 3:** Mutual interpersonal expectations, relationships and interpersonal conformity	Living up to what is expected by people close to you or what people generally expect of your role as son, brother, friend, etc. "Being good" is important and means having good motives, showing concern about others. It also means keeping mutual relationships, such as trust, loyalty, respect, and gratitude.	The need to be a good person in your own eyes and those of others. Your caring for others. Belief in the Golden Rule. Desire to maintain rules and authority which support stereotypical good behavior.	Perspective of the individual in relationships with other individuals. Aware of shared feelings, agreements, and expectations, which take primacy over individual interests. Relates points of view through the concrete Golden Rule, putting oneself in the other guy's shoes. Does not yet consider generalized system perspective.

Level and Stage	What is Right	Reason for Doing Right	Social Perspective of Stage
Stage 4: Social system and conscience	Fulfilling the actual duties to which you have agreed. Laws are to be upheld except in extreme cases where they conflict with other fixed social duties. Right is also contributing to society, the group, or institution.	To keep the institution going as a whole, to avoid the breakdown in the system "if everyone did it," or the imperative of conscience to meet one's defined obligations (easily confused with stage 3 belief in rules and authority).	Differentiates societal points of view from interpersonal agreement or motives. Takes the point of view of the system that defines roles and rules. Considers individual relations in terms of place in the system.
Level III: Postconventional, or Principled Stage 5: Social contract or utility and individual rights	Being aware that people hold a variety of values and opinions, that most values and rules are relative to your group. These relative rules should usually be upheld, however, in the interest of impartiality and because they are the social contract. Some	A sense of obligation to law because of one's social contract to make and abide by laws for the welfare of all and for the protection of all people's rights. A feeling of contractual commitment, freely entered upon, to family, friendship, trust, and work obligations.	Prior-to-society perspective. Perspective of a rational individual aware of values and rights prior to social attachments and contracts. Integrates perspectives by formal mechanisms of agreement, contract, objective impartiality, and due process. Considers moral and legal

Level and Stage	What is Right	Reason for Doing Right	Social Perspective of Stage
(Level III, Stage 5, cont.)	nonrelative values and rights like life and liberty, however, must be upheld in any society and regardless of majority opinion.	Concern that laws and duties be based on rational calculation of overall utility, "the greatest good for the greatest number."	points of view; recognzies that they sometimes conflict and finds it difficult to integrate them.
Stage 6: Universal ethical principles	Following self-chosen ethical principles. Particular laws or social agreements are usually valid because they rest on such principles. When laws violate these principles, one acts in accordance with the principle. Principles are universal principles of justice: the equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.	The belief as a rational person in the validity of universal moral principles, and a sense of personal commitment to them.	Perspective of a moral point of view from which social arrangements derive. Perspective is that of any rational individual recognizing the nature of morality or the fact that persons are ends in themselves and must be treated as such.

(Santrock, 1983)

FIGURE 1
CHARACTERISTICS AND ASSESSMENT OF STAGES



(Kohlberg in Rest, 1979, p. 52)

FIGURE 2 HEINZ DILEMMA

In Europe a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together $1,000 which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug, and I am going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. (Santrock, 1983, p. 346)

TABLE 2 SAMPLES OF REASONING AT EACH MORAL STAGE

	Reasoning which focuses on the Life issue (Heinz should steal the drug)	Reasoning which focuses on the Law issue (Heinz should not steal the drug)
Stage 1	because if you kill someone you'll be in jail for a long time and for stealing you aren't punished much.	because if he does he will be caught, locked up, etc.
Stage 2	if he thinks his wife would help if he were dying.	because if you commit a crime you have to go to jail long enough to make up for it; because if you steal you only have to pay back the person.
Stage 3	because he tried to be decent but now feels he has no choice; or because he would have the best of intentions.	in order to leave a good impression on the community; or so that others won't get the wrong impression.
Stage 4	because he is obligated by his marital responsibility, wedding vows, covenant of marriage, etc.	because respect for the law will be destroyed if citizens feel they may break the law anytime they disagree with it.
Stage 5	because that is part of the implicit social contract which all human beings have with one another; because responsibility to others is one of the basic principles that life is founded upon, etc.	because if individuals are to live together in society, there must be some common agreement; or because laws represent a necessary structure of social agreement.

(Siegal et al., 1982)

TABLE 3 SCORING OF
MORAL JUDGMENTS OF EICHMANN FOR DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES

Moral Judgments	Stage Score
In actual fact, I was merely a little cog in the machinery that carried out the directives of the German Reich.	1
I am neither a murderer nor a mass-murderer. I am a man of average character, with good qualities and many faults.	3
Yet what is there to "admit"? I carried out my orders. It would be as pointless to blame me for the whole final solution of the Jewish problem as to blame the official in charge of the railroads over which the Jewish transports travelled.	1
Where would we have been if everyone had thought things out in those days? You can do that today in the "new" German army. But with us an order was an order.	1
If I had sabotaged the order of the one-time Führer of the German Reich, Adolph Hitler, I would have been not only a scoundrel but a despicable pig like those who broke their military oath to join the ranks of the anti-Hitler criminals in the conspiracy of 20 July 1944.	1
I would like to stress again, however, that my department never gave a single annihilation order. We were responsible only for deportation.	2
My interest was only in the number of transport trains I had to provide. Whether they were bank directors or mental cases, the people who were loaded on these trains meant nothing to me.	2
It was really none of my business.	2
But to sum it all up, I must say that I regret nothing. Adolf Hitler may have been wrong all down the line, but one thing is beyond dispute: the man was able to work his way up from lance-corporal in the German army to Führer of a people of almost eighty million.	1

(Table 3, cont.)

Moral Judgments	Stage Score
I never met him personally, but his success alone proves to me that I should subordinate myself to this man. He was somehow so supremely capable that the people recognized him. And so with that justification I recognize him joyfully, and I still defend him.	1
I must say truthfully, that if we had killed all the ten million Jews that Himmler's statisticians originally listed in 1933, I would say, "Good, we have destroyed an enemy."	2
But here I do not mean wiping them out entirely. That would not be proper--and we carried out a proper war.	1

(Windmiller et al., 1980)

TABLE 4 MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR EARLY, MIDDLE AND LATE ADOLESCENT MALES AND FEMALES ON DIMENSIONS OF MORAL REASONING

		Moral Reasoning			
		Emotional Empathy		Flexibility	
Subjects	n	M	SD	M	SD
		Early Adolescence			
Males	28	107.86	11.38	22.14	6.23
Females	36	114.31	9.30	22.19	6.92
		Middle Adolescence			
Males	78	103.92	11.33	25.75	6.22
Females	54	121.73	8.56	24.49	5.06
		Late Adolescence			
Males	71	107.33	10.22	24.63	5.22
Females	63	121.03	9.64	22.02	4.75

(Hanson & Mullis, 1986, p. 184)